DDI #02040-86 27 June 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM:

Richard J. Kerr

Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT:

Action Agenda

REFERENCE:

DCI Memo, same subject, dated 10 June 1986

- 1. Over the past several years the DI has made progress in improving the quality of its product and making that product more relevant to the policymaker. Sustaining this momentum will not be easy. Future DCI's will have less clout and some future Administrations may want to push intelligence away from its current proactive role. The ability to sustain the current and critical role of intelligence will rest on the quality of our product, our objectivity—both real and perceived—and the relevance of the product to the policymaker.
- 2. The production of a timely, policy relevant and high quality product is fundamental to the DI's success. The keys to producing such a product are bright and experienced people, an environment that encourages creativity, direct contact with policymakers, increasingly detailed information on the full range of intelligence issues, and contacts with experts inside and outside government. Each of these key ingredients to a quality product need attention—now and in the future.

People and the Environment for Creativity

3. Analysts thrive in this organization not because of the personnel management system, a pleasant work environment, or the salary and awards. They work here and create quality products because they believe they are having impact on US policy, because the system allows individual initiative, and because of their direct involvement with the policymakers they serve. We need to foster this environment by rewarding creativity. But we also need to emphasize training analysts and their managers to question their assumptions, listen to critics, ask hard questions, and continually test their conclusions. Training and good leadership are essential. We have a way to go in both areas.



4. Looking to the future, there are a number of specific measures we must implement and goals we must pursue to train our analysts and provide them the experiences, contacts, and tools they will need to continue to produce high quality intelligence:

We must expand and institutionalize our contacts with policymakers and experts inside and outside government. We have made significant strides in opening channels to the policymakers but we have a long way to go in systematically exploiting the expertise of those in the academic and business worlds. We still are inclined to respond to our critics by ignoring them or identifying the flaws in their arguments rather than acknowledging our own shortcomings and involving outsiders in the analytic process. Analysts and managers need to go out and aggressively pursue critics and those with differing views. We need to salt the DI with some people who have grown up outside this organization. DI management must push this from above and be willing to reward those who develop contacts outside. It also needs to take some chances on people who have limited intelligence experience but have had rich careers in other fields.

We must develop better techniques for presenting information to our customers. Hard copy current intelligence and research products always will be required. But an increasingly large number of people are computer literate and will want their information sent to them electronically. This approach might simplify security (need to know) and serve the customers more directly by giving them what they need, when they want it. It also could tie the customers more directly to their intelligence support. In addition, we need to put out some of our research product in a form that facilitates retrieval and makes our product a more integral part of the policy and military planning process.

We must underscore for consumers what we in CIA--after consultation with policymakers—believe are the most important intelligence issues the US Government will be facing and on which we are working. For FY-87 and beyond, we are introducing a new format for our annual research program that highlights up front our anticipated substantive priorities for the next 5 years and also draws attention to the dozen or so specific issues that we will focus on in our research and publications in the upcoming single year. These statements will be followed by our traditional display of issues and office programs. The FY-87 program, prepared in this format, will be available for your review in August in accordance with the normal research planning cycle.

We also need to continue to place analysts in positions overseas where they can gain a more intimate knowledge of the countries they study and to put them on rotation to policy positions to understand better the strengths and limitations of the policy process. This comes at a time when there are cuts in our overseas presence and money is being reduced to support training and external research. We hope to negotiate with the DO new procedures to allow increased numbers of analysts to serve overseas in reports officer or case officer positions where they can assist the Agency's mission while acquiring valuable overseas experience.

We will be developing new procedures and training programs to increase our analytsts' capability to task the more complex technical collection systems that will exist in the early 1990s, and will be working to expand the DI's role in identifying gaps in information and in influencing the decisions on which collection systems to fund. We need to reduce the involvement of our officers in the time-consuming aspects of tasking by developing new computer-assisted tools that can accommodate all-source collection strategies that will enable us to receive the specific information we need and avoid a redundant tasking of different systems. This will require close cooperation among DI units, the collection committees of the IC Staff, the DS&T and NSA. We are already increasing the numbers of our officers serving in these other units to facilitate this process.

The DI must prepare itself to receive, analyze, and exploit the vastly increased amounts of data that we will be receiving from new systems. This will involve increased manpower and longer hours, especially in CPAS, CRES, and OIA. The latter, for example, will have not only an intensified workload and new equipment to master, but a wealth of new information and capabilities from literal, radar, and multispectral imagery.

We have well underway, and will continue, a program to enhance the capability and productivity of analysts throughout the Directorate by providing them advanced work stations far more capable than the "dumb" terminals that most analysts now have. These new work stations will allow file retrieval, information display and manipulation, and word processing simultaneously. Within the next year we will have a terminal on every analyst's desk, will have made considerable progress in our transition to PCs connected to mainframe computers, and will have begun experimentation with three varieties of still more sophisticated work stations with an eye to our more distant needs. In the 1988-89 time frame we will expand our mainframe capability and will acquire the CRAY supercomputer and the capabilities it will bring in more sophisticated weapons and economic analysis. The Directorate has recently taken an important step to prepare itself for further progress in the ADP area by establishing the independent Office of Information Resources managed by officers with backgrounds in the DI and DDA's OIT.

The Directorate in the coming years must establish an effective system of reallocating personnel and financial resources among the offices in ways that we have not been forced to do in the past. The DI has grown rapidly over the last 5 years and has been able to meet most new challenges with new people and new money, but we must now prepare for the eventuality that in the coming years we will be obliged to work with our 1989 personnel ceiling of approximately 3,200 and with no budget growth. With dollars and positions held constant, new responsibilities and better performance in the future must derive from heightened productivity. With the rapid growth of the last few years, we probably have introduced some redundancy and inefficiency that we can eliminate to free up additional resources. We will look also at opportunities for increased use of interoffice and interdirectorate task forces. We have already seen how this can pay off in the nonacoustic ASW and terrorism areas. The DI and DS&T recently established such a group to work the

mobile missile problem, and I expect we will be doing the same on SDI and other issues.

Continued improvement is necessary and will be made in a number of our personnel practices, as it is our ability to recruit superior officers and make them proud to serve policymakers' needs that is the basis of our strength and reputation. We are revising our recruiting procedures to avoid clogging the processing system with large numbers of applicants and instead are focusing on high priority skill areas. We will continue our efforts with OTE to improve critically important training programs for our growing proportion of new secretaries, ADP support personnel, analysts, and branch chiefs. Most important, in the personnel area the DI must continue to work with other directorates of the Agency to revise fundamentally our procedures for recruiting to reduce our desperate and growing shortage of clerical employees.

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